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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #05506-84
25 September 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM: [REDACTED]
National Intelligence Officer for USSR

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SUBJECT: Soviet Options on US Withdrawal from UNESCO

1. Attached are items responsive to your tasking on the issue of US withdrawal from UNESCO and Mr. Marks' questions to you.

At TAB B is a paper prepared by OGI with SOVA inputs characterizing Soviet equities in UNESCO and their possible responses to various scenarios of US withdrawal or staying in. This paper was drafted in the belief you would wish to send it to Mr. Marks and he would circulate it to the Commission.

At TAB A is a memo from [REDACTED] D/OGI, providing more background on Soviet involvement in UNESCO, the complex "management reforms" the US is seeking [REDACTED]

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2. I assume you still wish to inform your own position, as an advisor of the President, on whether we should stay or leave UNESCO. My own view remains that, whether we stay or leave, we should act in the context of an energetic national policy to contest Soviet abuse of the UNO in general and to win back a large new degree of US influence there.

3. If we stay in UNESCO it should be at the price of very farreaching accommodation on the management reforms. And we ought to set up a plan for replacing its Director, Mr. M'bow, when his term expires in a few years.

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4. If we leave, we should aim to bring the organization to a moribund state, through denial of funds and legitimacy, and then press for its revival on a more sound basis.

5. As I noted in my earlier memo, our main problem will be to get the people and organizations who deal with the UN to take seriously the challenge of political struggle, to give Ambassador Kirkpatrick's efforts deeper policy roots.

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cc: D/OGI
D/SOVA

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Planning, Strategy

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17 September 1984


MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: UNESCO

1. Leonard Marks, formerly Director of USIA, is chairing a commission designated by Secretary Shultz to advise on whether we should pull out of UNESCO. He asked us for an assessment on how the Soviets would react-- either withdraw or let their interest lapse, or take it over and use it. He also asked what difference it would make if we stay in to maintain influence over that instrument, take the chance that the Soviets will move to use it as an instrument in the Third World, discontinue support and have the Germans and British maintain the free world interests or what?

2. The attached doesn't quite get at the real question to my satisfaction. I'd like your input on this question and then we will talk about how to send it back through the system or whatever needs to be done.



William J. Casey

Attachment:

Memo to DCI and DDCI from D/OGI,
dtd 13 Sept 84, re Soviet Response
to US Withdrawal from UNESCO

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA

NIO USSR

FROM

: [REDACTED]
Director of Global Issues

SUBJECT : Soviet Reactions to Potential US Withdrawal from
UNESCO [REDACTED]

1. Action: The attached memorandum is prepared so that you may provide it to Mr. Leonard Marks. [REDACTED]

2. Background: Leonard Marks, a member of the US-UNESCO Monitoring Panel appointed by Secretary Shultz, requested an assessment of how the Soviets would react to US withdrawal from the United Nations Scientific, Educational and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The attached memorandum, prepared by OGI and SOVA, provides that assessment.

[REDACTED]

3. Since the US announced its intention to withdraw from UNESCO in December 1983, the United States has been engaged in negotiations designed to bring about "management reforms" in the organization. Essentially, the US and other Western Members want to regain some measure of control over UNESCO management and programs by:

- o Requiring that major decisions, including the budget, have the support of the Western group that provides the bulk of the UNESCO budget. The effect of this proposal would be to give the US and its allies a veto over major UNESCO decisions.
- o Cutting back UNESCO programs to core educational, scientific and cultural efforts for which UNESCO was founded and move away from certain human

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[redacted]

rights, disarmament and press freedom efforts
that the US finds biased against US interests.

- o Improving UNESCO management through a series of initiatives including, requiring regular question and answer sessions with top management.

We believe the UNESCO negotiations will continue through early December, at which point UNESCO will make its last best offer. We doubt that the US and allies will succeed in gaining a veto over UNESCO budget and major programs because that would directly challenge the principle of one nation one vote. We believe that other concessions concerning management accountability and some program content are likely. We also note, as we do in the Marks memo, that the Soviets have an interest in the US remaining in UNESCO and are seeking accommodation in the form of a "gentlemen's agreement" designed to meet US interests in budget reform. [redacted]

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4. Underlying the US initiatives is the view that UNESCO is not only poorly managed, but that the US is paying 25 percent of the budget of an organization sponsoring both activities inimical to the US and supportive of Soviet interests. As the memorandum for Mr: Marks states, UNESCO is tailor-made for Soviet initiatives. In fact, the Soviets already have substantial influence in UNESCO beginning with senior Secretariat staff slots through which Moscow influences program content. Moscow has been particularly effective in using UNESCO as a conduit for distributing Soviet propaganda. The Soviets have even "loaned" oceanographic research vessels and crews to UNESCO.

[redacted] 25X1

5. Soviet use of UNESCO tracks with our observations of Moscow's efforts in other UN organizations. Since 1956, the Soviets have been positioning themselves and building their capability to support programs of interest to them and to deflect those they oppose. Our observations indicate that the Soviets have treated the UN as an important asset in the conduct of their foreign relations and a means of conducting intelligence operations. Today, the Soviets have nearly 800 well placed employees in the UN Secretariat. Their Foreign Ministry and intelligence agencies are prepared to systematically exploit the UN. Soviet use of the UN is, of course, facilitated because a majority of UN members are sympathetic to many of Moscow's positions. [redacted]

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SOVIET REACTIONS TO US OPTIONS ON UNESCO WITHDRAWAL

We believe current UNESCO negotiations have three likely outcomes each of which would present Moscow with different opportunities and, in some cases, burdens.

I Remain in UNESCO after Securing Management Concessions

A key issue with regard to this outcome is the extent to which the US secures its negotiating objectives concerning UNESCO reforms. If members perceive changes as essentially cosmetic, we believe US efforts to improve management or secure policy changes in other UN organizations would be weakened--particularly with regard to current UNCTAD negotiations. We believe the Soviets will have an opportunity to gain a small victory by pointing to their support for Third World interests against US efforts to modify programs and replace Director General M'Bow. We see little lasting impact from the Soviet perspective.

If the US remains after securing what are perceived to be substantial management concessions, we believe the Soviets would say that now that the US has succeeded in bullying UNESCO, the Third World can expect further US attempts to affect UN policies and programs the Third World considers to be important. We do not believe that this argument would have lasting impact--future US behavior would be the key factor.

The most important impact of a US decision to stay in UNESCO--perceptions aside--is that Soviet opportunities to exploit UNESCO would remain essentially unchanged from their current status. We believe UNESCO would go on much as before. We believe that M'Bow would continue his career-long pattern of playing off East and West in order to achieve Third World goals.

II Withdraw from UNESCO along with Other Western Members

We have seen no indications that other Western governments are prepared to withdraw from UNESCO if reform negotiations fail to achieve satisfactory results. However, if the US, UK, and FRG would withdraw (we completely discount host country France), UNESCO would lose nearly forty percent of its budget and a significant portion of its claim to be a full scale international organization.

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We believe the Soviets would undertake a substantial propaganda campaign accusing the West of abandoning Third World cultural, scientific and educational programs etc. and would argue that the West will try the same tactics in other UN agencies. Despite some propaganda advantages, we believe the Soviets would be very concerned about about three main points:

First, they would come under pressure from Third World members to increase their contributions to UNESCO and, we believe, the Soviets would lose ground when they refuse the request.

Second, Moscow would no longer have a full, large scale UN organization in which to operate. The breadth of Soviet efforts to use UNESCO to achieve their objectives, the extent of Soviet presence on the UNESCO staff (Tab A), and the size of the Soviet delegation indicate that the Soviets consider UNESCO to be one of the most important international organizations. We believe that UNESCO programs are tailor-made for Soviet initiatives designed to influence media content, particularly in the Third World, to establish contact with influential persons in the media, educational, scientific and cultural fields and to gain specific technical information. The Soviets have been exceptionally effective in placing their people in key UNESCO secretariat jobs such as Director of all UNESCO education programs.

In recent years we have observed Soviet:

- o Efforts to use UNESCO publication services for propaganda purposes.
- o Use of UNESCO media services to expand distribution of Soviet radio and TV programs.
- o Initiatives to establish a UNESCO database of valuable copyright information.
- o Active support of Third World proposals to establish the New World Information and Communication Order.
- o Use of UNESCO as a cover for espionage as evidenced by French expulsion of Soviet intelligence officers in the UNESCO secretariat.

With UNESCO programs and staff reduced due to the substantial budget cut resulting from Western members' withdrawal, each of these aspects of Soviet use of UNESCO would be adversely affected and could not be

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easily replaced with bilateral programs or in other multilateral organizations.

Third, To the extent that US and other Western scientists and researchers contribute useful technological information and other products which find their way to the USSR through UNESCO, the Soviets would lose a source of information which is apparently valuable to them.

Essentially, with the key Western members out, the Soviets would achieve a hollow victory, gaining influence over an organization that may not be worth influencing.

III Withdraw While Western Allies Remain

UNESCO would lose 25 percent of its budget with US withdrawal, but would remain a large international organization with significant programs. Generally, the US would have a greatly reduced ability to monitor and restrain Soviet initiatives and abuses of UNESCO programs and staff while the Soviets gain influence. We believe the key Soviet initiatives are likely to include:

- o Intensified efforts to support Third World calls for a New World Information and Communication Order and to take steps to implement such practices as licensing of journalists.
- o Use of UNESCO as a platform to press its case for developing countries use of Soviet foreign news services as alternatives to the Western press.
- o Moves toward increased Soviet influence in the UNESCO secretariat. The Soviet Ambassador to UNESCO, at a May press conference, suggested that US personnel in UNESCO should leave when the US withdraws. In theory, US citizens are international civil servants who could not be removed, but in practice, continued employment could be difficult for non tenured American employees and new hiring of Americans would be curtailed, eroding the presence of US citizens over time.
- o Enhancement of its efforts to secure technological developments without paying royalties based on copyright protection.

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- o Countering any human rights issues raised in UNESCO by shifting the discussion to disarmament, a subject Moscow has prepared for by placing a Soviet official in the office responsible for disarmament issues.

We have seen little evidence that Western European members or Japan would undertake meaningful, effective efforts to check Soviet influence or Third World demands on the organization in the absence of the United States.

Soviet Opportunities While Negotiations Proceed

Whatever the United States decides with regard to participation in UNESCO, as negotiations proceed through the fall, we believe that the Soviet Union will follow its well established pattern of behavior in international organizations similar to UNESCO by:

- o Supporting Third World positions and demands whenever possible.
- o Avoiding commitments to provide substantial additional resources in future years.
- o Agreeing to proposals to improve the management of the organization provided the changes are not strenuously resisted by Third World blocs and do not cost the Soviets more money.

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During the coming weeks, we believe the Soviets will:

- o Argue that the budget cuts resulting from US withdrawal will adversely affect developing countries and particular groups within those countries--journalists, scholars, etc. Given the size of the US contribution but uncertainty about how the cuts would be allocated, the Soviets could raise concerns among a substantial number of states and beneficiary groups. We believe Soviet arguments would have to be tempered by their reluctance to increase their own contribution as was the case when the US withdrew from the ILO.
- o Accuse the US of "bullying" tactics which affect the essential operating principles of international organizations by threatening to withdraw if its

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demands are not met. The Soviets are likely to point to US withdrawal from the ILO (1977 to 1980), suspension of US participation in the UN's ad hoc committee on the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace, reduction in US participation in the UN's Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and intimations of US withdrawal from the UN Conference on Trade and Development as a pattern of US opposition to international organizations in which Third World countries have a great stake. For example, a 15 June TASS item charged, "The United States decision to withdraw from UNESCO has finalized a malicious campaign which has been conducted against it by US reactionary circles for a long time."

We do not believe that these Soviet debating points would have a lasting impact on its Third World target. The key test for the Third World will be whether UNESCO continues to provide resources for programs of interest to them.

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United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)—Paris

UNESCO was founded in 1945 to promote international collaboration in the fields of education, science, and culture. It has 160 members. The Soviet Union joined in 1954.

UNESCO's secretariat is headed by a director general, who is appointed by the General Conference upon the nomination of the Executive Board. As the chief

administrative officer of the organization, the secretariat is charged with formulating draft work programs and proposals for action by the Conference and the Board. Staff appointments are by personal choice but must be geographically representative.

Total staff: 2,800

Number of Soviets/East Europeans: 73

United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization

Grade	Name	Title	Location	Country
ADG	Tanguiane, S.	Assistant Director General	Paris	USSR
D-1	Avakov, R.	Senior Program Officer	Paris	USSR
	Dumitrescu, S.	Director of Division	Paris	Romania
	Paszkowski, M.	Deputy Director	Paris	Poland
	Pobukovsky, M.	Director of Division	Paris	USSR
	Sibrava, V.	Director of Division	Paris	Czechoslovakia
P-5	Zachariev, Z.	Director of Division	Paris	Bulgaria
	Alferov, Y.	Program Specialist	Geneva	USSR
	Dolbnin, G.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Fedoresak, I.	Program Specialist	Paris	Hungary
	Herold, P.	Chief of Section	Paris	Germany
	Kabatchenko, M.	Chief of Section	Paris	USSR
	Kolessov, V.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Koptilov, V.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Korner, H.	Program Specialist	Paris	Czechoslovakia
	Kotchetkov, V.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Krivtsov, Y.	Chief of Section	Paris	USSR
	Oliounine, I.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Snezhko, I.	Senior Program Officer	Paris	USSR
	Tchoguvadze, G.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR

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United Nations Educational, Scientific,
and Cultural Organization (continued)

Grade	Name	Title	Location	Country
P-4	Arsov, M.	Liaison Officer	New York	Bulgaria
	Belikov, V.	Senior Purchasing Officer	Paris	USSR
	Bertels, A.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Boutzev, C.	Program Specialist	Paris	Bulgaria
	Chlebowska, K.	Field Program Officer	Paris	Poland
	Gorbenko, B.	Interpreter	Paris	USSR
	Guelekva, Z.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Khvilon, E.	Chief of Section	Paris	USSR
	Kouznetsov, N.	Senior Editor	Paris	USSR
	Kovacs, M.	Program Specialist	Paris	Hungary
	Matsui, S.	Program Specialist	Paris	Ukraine
	Matveev, Y.	Recruitment Officer	Paris	Ukraine
	Michulsky, V.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Mirochnikov, L.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Naidenov, V.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Oudatchine, V.	Producer	Paris	USSR
	Petrouchine, S.	Reviser	Paris	USSR
	Reshov, M.	Executive Assistant to the ADG	Paris	USSR
	Rojnov, V.	Administrative Officer	Paris	USSR
	Rousko, I.	Program Specialist	Paris	Ukraine
	Roussinov, M.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Sabirov, F.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Shchebrov, V.	Program Specialist	Paris	Belorussia
	Smirnov, I.	Reviser	Paris	USSR
	Soloviev, E.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Zykine, Y.	Reviser	Paris	USSR
P-3	Akimov, I.	Translator	Paris	USSR
	Barsukov, S.	Translator	Paris	USSR
	Garmonov, I.	Reviser	Paris	USSR
	Gladneva, V.	Translator	Paris	USSR
	Guerassimov, E.	Legal Officer	Paris	USSR
	Jouravlev, A.	Translator	Paris	USSR
	Khudin, A.	Translator	Paris	USSR
	Koridze, A.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Kostikov, V.	Editor	Paris	USSR
	Legomska-Dworniak, M. M. A	Program Specialist	Paris	Poland
	Serebrennikov, V.	Program Specialist	Paris	Belorussia
	Souzioumov, A.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Sova, A.	Translator	Paris	USSR
P-2	Iakoubenko, S.	Assistant Finance Officer	Paris	USSR
	Lebedev, I.	Assistant Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
G-4	Petrenko, T.	Clerk	Paris	USSR
	Shtarbanov, G.	Senior Clerk	New York	Bulgaria
G-3	Brintchouk, R.	Audio Typist	Paris	USSR
	Calabuig, P.	Receptionist	Paris	USSR
	Jankowskaia, M.	Composition Typist	Paris	USSR
	Kolychalov, E.	Composition Typist	Paris	USSR
	Lebedeva, N.	Composition Typist	Paris	USSR
	Semenova, G.	Audio Typist	Paris	USSR
	Stepanian, M.	Audio Typist	Paris	USSR
	Vastchenko, A.	Micrographic Reproduction Operator	Paris	USSR
	Vernand Traykova, V.	Clerk	Paris	Bulgaria
G-2	Billant, L.	Composition Typist	Paris	USSR

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #05379-84
19 September 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council

SUBJECT: Implications of Withdrawal from UNESCO

1. This response to your query is based on incomplete knowledge, prior prejudice, and a few conversations with more knowledgeable people.

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2. It is clear that Soviet control of its chief and domination of its staff have turned UNESCO into a Soviet front for espionage and Third Worldish ideological campaigning, with US and other Western money. On the record, we euphemize this as "politicization." This prompted the Administration to declare an intent to withdraw, unless some "management reforms" correct the situation. There is now a major push among UNESCO's "constitutents" in the government, at State and the scientific community, to keep us in on any pretext. On balance, Herb and a like-minded friend of mine at State predict we will stay in for minimal concessions because "it will look bad" to proceed with withdrawal. If we stay on this basis, things won't improve mainly because our government, especially those engaged with international organizations, are neither interested in nor adept at the conduct of political struggle. This is the essence of our problem, and it affects many other aspects of our dealings with the UN, including the Secretariat in New York.

3. A US pullout will marginally increase Soviet control, already great, but make the organization somewhat less valuable because of reduced funding. If we do pull out, we ought to make a major effort to get other Western contributors to join us. The result is likely to be a blatant Soviet front of little influence.

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4. The alternative is to stay in, but at the price of the head of the Director and perhaps a reduction of Soviet staffing. In any case, we should follow up with a political campaign with new people to recapture some of the control. This, it seems to me, stipulates a basic policy decision and operational follow-up to contest Soviet abuse of the whole UN Organization. Those I've talked to who think this would be desirable in principle doubt we have the political or bureaucratic stomach for this approach. But it's worth a try.

5. A third alternative would be to strive for a substantial Western pullout, following which we would press to revive a moribund organization along more congenial lines. Herb says this seems to have worked in the case of the International Labor Organization.

6. The worst alternative, I would argue, is that one that will come most naturally: Stay in but without a commitment to wage a struggle against Soviet abuse throughout the UNO. We should not stay in because it would look bad to pull out or because it would even further Soviet control. It will look worse for larger issues if we stay for no or minimal satisfaction after threatening withdrawal.

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DDI- 05077/84

SEP 13 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for Intelligence *f*

FROM :
Director of Global Issues

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
SUBJECT : Soviet Response to US Withdrawal from UNESCO

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The attached memorandum provides our analysis of likely Soviet initiatives in response to the announced intention of the United States to withdraw from UNESCO by the end of 1984. The response was prepared by OGI and SOVA.

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Attachment:
As stated



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US WITHDRAWAL FROM UNESCO: SOVIET GAINS AND LOSSES

Current Soviet Exploitation of UNESCO

1. The breadth of Soviet efforts to use UNESCO to achieve their objectives, the extent of Soviet presence on the UNESCO staff (Tab A), and the size of the Soviet delegation indicate that the Soviets consider UNESCO to be one of the most important international organizations. We believe that UNESCO programs are tailor-made for Soviet initiatives designed to influence media content, particularly in the Third World, establish contact with influential persons in the media, educational, scientific and cultural fields and to gain specific technical information. [REDACTED]

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2. In recent years we have observed Soviet:

- o Efforts to use UNESCO publication services for propaganda purposes.
 - o Use of UNESCO media services to expand distribution of Soviet radio and TV programs.
 - o Initiatives to establish a UNESCO database of valuable copyright information.
 - o Active support of Third World proposals to establish the New World Information and Communication Order.
 - o Use of the UNESCO as a cover for espionage as evidenced by French expulsion of Soviet intelligence officers in the UNESCO secretariat.
- [REDACTED]

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Soviet Tactics and Opportunities

3. As UNESCO reform negotiations proceed through the fall, we believe that the Soviet Union will follow its well established pattern of behavior in international organizations similar to UNESCO by:

- o Supporting Third World positions and demands wherever possible.
- o Avoiding commitments to provide substantial additional resources in future years.

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- o Agreeing to proposals to improve the management of the organization provided the changes are not strenuously resisted by Third World blocs and do not cost the Soviets more money. [redacted]

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4. During the coming weeks, we believe the Soviets will:

- o Argue that the budget cuts resulting from US withdrawal will adversely affect developing countries and particular groups within those countries--journalists, scholars, etc. Given the size of the US contribution but uncertainty about how the cuts would be allocated, the Soviets could raise concerns among a substantial number of states and beneficiary groups. We believe Soviet arguments would have to be tempered by their reluctance to increase their own contribution as was the case when the US withdrew from the ILO.
- o Accuse the US of "bullying" tactics which affect the essential operating principles of international organizations by threatening to withdraw if its demands are not met. The Soviets are likely to point to US withdrawal from the ILO (1977 to 1980), suspension of US participation in the UN's ad hoc committee on the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace, reduction in US participation in the UN's Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and intimations of US withdrawal from the UN Conference on Trade and Development as a pattern of US opposition to international organizations in which Third World countries have a great stake. For example, a 15 June TASS item charged, "The United States decision to withdraw from UNESCO has finalized a malicious campaign which has been conducted against it by US reactionary circles for a long time." [redacted]

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5. After a US withdrawal, the Soviets would have renewed opportunities to exploit the vacuum. Generally, the US would have a greatly reduced ability to monitor and restrain Soviet initiatives and abuses of UNESCO programs and staff while the Soviets gain influence. We believe the key Soviet initiatives are likely to include:

- o Intensified efforts to support Third World calls for a New World Information and Communication Order and to take steps to implement such practices as licensing of journalists.

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- o Use of UNESCO as a platform to press its case for developing countries use of Soviet foreign news services as alternatives to the Western press.
- o Moves toward increased Soviet influence in the UNESCO secretariat. The Soviet Ambassador to UNESCO, at a May press conference, suggested that US personnel in UNESCO should leave when the US withdraws. In theory, US citizens are international civil servants who could not be removed, but in practice, continued employment could be difficult for non tenured American employees and new hiring of Americans would be curtailed, eroding the presence of US citizens over time.
- o Enhancement of its efforts to secure technological developments without paying royalties based on copyright protection.
- o Countering any human rights issues raised in UNESCO by shifting the discussion to disarmament, a subject Moscow has prepared for by placing a Soviet official in the office responsible for disarmament issues.

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Soviet Losses from US Withdrawal

6. Despite gaining some significant advantage from a US withdrawal, we believe Soviet initiatives would be tempered by resistance from Western countries remaining in the organization. Furthermore, the Soviets would come under pressure from Third World members to increase their contributions to UNESCO and, we believe, the Soviets would lose ground when they refuse the request. To the extent that US scientists and researchers contribute useful technological information and other products which find their way to the USSR through UNESCO, the Soviets would lose a source of significant information. Ironically, the Soviets would benefit from successful negotiations concerning management reforms because they have an interest in improving the management of UNESCO. A poorly run organization adversely affects the programs which they are using to achieve their own goals. A smaller UNESCO, without access to US funds, would not have the resources to undertake some of the activities of interest to Moscow.

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7. United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)—Paris

UNESCO was founded in 1945 to promote international collaboration in the fields of education, science, and culture. It has 160 members. The Soviet Union joined in 1954.

administrative officer of the organization, the secretariat is charged with formulating draft work programs and proposals for action by the Conference and the Board. Staff appointments are by personal choice but must be geographically representative.

Total staff: 2,800

UNESCO's secretariat is headed by a director general, who is appointed by the General Conference upon the nomination of the Executive Board. As the chief

Number of Soviets/East Europeans: 73

United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization

Grade	Name	Title	Location	Country
ADG	Tanguiane, S.	Assistant Director General	Paris	USSR
D-1	Avakov, R.	Senior Program Officer	Paris	USSR
	Dumitrescu, S.	Director of Division	Paris	Romania
	Paszkowski, M.	Deputy Director	Paris	Poland
	Pobukovsky, M.	Director of Division	Paris	USSR
	Sibrava, V.	Director of Division	Paris	Czechoslovakia
	Zachariev, Z.	Director of Division	Paris	Bulgaria
P-5	Alferov, Y.	Program Specialist	Geneva	USSR
	Dolbnin, G.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Fedorcsak, I.	Program Specialist	Paris	Hungary
	Herold, P.	Chief of Section	Paris	Germany
	Kabatchenko, M.	Chief of Section	Paris	USSR
	Kolessov, V.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Koptilov, V.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Korner, H.	Program Specialist	Paris	Czechoslovakia
	Kotchikov, V.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Krivtsov, Y.	Chief of Section	Paris	USSR
	Oliounine, I.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Snezhko, I.	Senior Program Officer	Paris	USSR
	Tchogovadze, G.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR

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United Nations Educational, Scientific,
and Cultural Organization (continued)

Grade	Name	Title	Location	Country
P-4	Arsov, M.	Liaison Officer	New York	Bulgaria
	Belikov, V.	Senior Purchasing Officer	Paris	USSR
	Bertels, A.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Boutzev, C.	Program Specialist	Paris	Bulgaria
	Chlebowska, K.	Field Program Officer	Paris	Poland
	Gorbenko, B.	Interpreter	Paris	USSR
	Guelekva, Z.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Khvilon, E.	Chief of Section	Paris	USSR
	Kouznetsov, N.	Senior Editor	Paris	USSR
	Kovacs, M.	Program Specialist	Paris	Hungary
	Matsui, S.	Program Specialist	Paris	Ukraine
	Matveev, Y.	Recruitment Officer	Paris	Ukraine
	Michulsky, V.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Mirochnikov, L.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Naidenov, V.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Oudatchine, V.	Producer	Paris	USSR
	Petrouchine, S.	Reviser	Paris	USSR
	Reshov, M.	Executive Assistant to the ADG	Paris	USSR
	Rojnov, V.	Administrative Officer	Paris	USSR
	Rousko, I.	Program Specialist	Paris	Ukraine
	Roussinov, M.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Sabirov, F.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Shchebrov, V.	Program Specialist	Paris	Belorussia
	Smirnov, I.	Reviser	Paris	USSR
	Soloviev, E.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Zykine, Y.	Reviser	Paris	USSR
P-3	Akimov, I.	Translator	Paris	USSR
	Barsukov, S.	Translator	Paris	USSR
	Garmonov, I.	Reviser	Paris	USSR
	Gladneva, V.	Translator	Paris	USSR
	Guerassimov, E.	Legal Officer	Paris	USSR
	Jouravlev, A.	Translator	Paris	USSR
	Khudin, A.	Translator	Paris	USSR
	Koridze, A.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Kostikov, V.	Editor	Paris	USSR
	Legomska-Dworniak, M. M. A	Program Specialist	Paris	Poland
	Serebrennikov, V.	Program Specialist	Paris	Belorussia
	Souzioumov, A.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Sova, A.	Translator	Paris	USSR
P-2	Iakoubenko, S.	Assistant Finance Officer	Paris	USSR
	Lebedev, I.	Assistant Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
G-4	Petrenko, T.	Clerk	Paris	USSR
	Shtarbanov, G.	Senior Clerk	New York	Bulgaria
G-3	Brintchouk, R.	Audio Typist	Paris	USSR
	Calabuig, P.	Receptionist	Paris	USSR
	Jankowskaia, M.	Composition Typist	Paris	USSR
	Kolychalov, E.	Composition Typist	Paris	USSR
	Lebedeva, N.	Composition Typist	Paris	USSR
	Semenova, G.	Audio Typist	Paris	USSR
	Stepanian, M.	Audio Typist	Paris	USSR
	Vastchenko, A.	Micrographic Reproduction Operator	Paris	USSR
G-2	Vermand Traykova, V.	Clerk	Paris	Bulgaria
	Billant, L.	Composition Typist	Paris	USSR

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